A Reminder of Intelligence Leadership and National Oversight
Friday, February 5, 2021
As the Intelligence Community (IC) works to rebuild trust between its agencies, it's citizens, and other partner nations, this is a great time to remind us all about the basics of how leadership within the IC and it's ongoing struggle with national oversight through checks and balances. I originally wrote this piece in October of 2018.
Setting the Scene
It is the role of Congress to monitor and create oversight of the intelligence community. Congress checks for the abuse of power within the seventeen agencies including the ODNI and considers abuse of power by the other two branches of government. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) are the two primary governing bodies that provide oversight of American intelligence (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). As the Executive Branch sets foreign policy and intelligence priorities, Congress is to be kept ‘fully informed’ of large-scale intelligence activities set forth by The White House (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). This procedure is mandated by the National Security Act of 1947.
The laws of oversight and leadership become complicated as competing interests are tasked with budgeting, making intelligence law, enacting recommendations, and following through on programs. Each stakeholder has their own interest. These interests often clash as the oversight of IC has turned into a power grab by congressional committees, as well as the executive and judicial branches. The politization of intelligence matters, lack of congressional oversight, and the increase of influences by the executive branch all must be addressed to ensure the best possible leadership and oversight outcomes.
The Politization of Intelligence Matters
Politization of the IC's recommendations, outcomes, and funding does not just stem from political parties, but rather expediency, groupthink, and biases that may exist within Congress or in the Executive Branch. Mark Lowenthal, a career intelligence expert, states that analysts alter assessments to support policy, lawmakers influence intelligence analysis outcomes, a history of cognitive bias on the part of analysts, and lawmakers often ‘cherry pick’ analysis to support their own ideals (Tomes, 2015). Such destructive habits undermine the autonomy and independence of the intelligence community. Additionally, given the secrecy in which the IC operates, dissent is often dismissed, and whistleblowers may be silenced as a result.
Former Secretary of Defense, then CIA Director, Robert Gates said of politization of intelligence in the 1990s, “deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence” (Gleeson, 2017). Another issue with politization deals around false information, group think narratives, and different ways of categorizing intelligence threats based on a single individual rather than involving a process of many (Gleeson, 2017). Utilizing estimative probabilities in intelligence assessments is also an obstacle to politicization of intelligence through Congress. The goal of estimative probabilities is to reduce the amount of uncertainty when analyzing information (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012).
Terms such as probably, likely, certain, somewhat certain, et al., are open to numerous interpretations by Congress, and therefore can be politized as wanting intelligence to say what is politically convenient over what may be occurring. Estimative probability is vital to assessing viable alternatives to an action. Analysis of competing hypothesis (ACH) is the core of intelligence (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012). The IC must conduct this analysis free and independently of out all outside influence. However, when this analysis is presented to congressional committees or the White House, options may be chosen based on their own interpretations of risk, an open definition of estimative probability, and what is politically expedient.
Lack of Congressional Oversight
A long-term debate exists as to whether congressional oversight over the IC is too intrusive, counterproductive, and political; or does not go far enough to keep program scopes and civil liberties in check. As Congress represents the American people, they must also strike a balance between doing what is necessary for national security and explaining their votes and policies to their voters. Loch Johnson, a University of Georgia professor stated, “September 11 was an intelligence failure, but it's also a policy failure, not only in the White House but in Congress. There's really a heavy onus on these intelligence committees to probe what's going on” (Priest, 2004). Politization of intelligence often comes at the expedience of national security, considering real threats, or what may be convenient for the next congressional election.
Former Ohio Senator, Mike DeWine, stated that the learning curve is quite large for those serving on the congressional intelligence committees (Priest, 2004). The failure or lack of understanding of policies and procedures within the IC is too cumbersome, especially to learn in one Senate or House term. DeWine recommends a restructuring to make oversight more “user friendly” for the average Congressperson to understand and convey to constituents and the agencies themselves. A solution to this problem must involve revisiting the 9/11 Commission Report and further streamlining dissemination techniques now that most of the recommendations have been implemented on the Federal, State, and local levels. Lastly, the barriers between Congress and the intelligence community must be further siloed from political influence.
In the event congressional oversight committees were to consolidate into a few bodies, the Executive Branch would have more influence as would the specific Congressmembers on the new committees. Also, the politization of individual nominations to several intelligence agencies would become a problem, further blending in the independence of intelligence.
Executive Branch Influences
Prior to September 11th, the Executive Branch was able to reduce congressional committees overseeing intelligence from eight to two over the course of the 1980s (Halchin & Kaiser, 2012). As a result, it also reduced the number of Congressmembers who can receive information requiring a clearance. As Congress is not briefed as frequently as the Executive Branch on intelligence matters, it is difficult to tell what may constitute a national emergency or crucial military exercise (Marshall, 2008). Congress must rely on the Executive Branch to disseminate information to the relevant committees (Marshall, 2008). This is an example of how the Executive Branch obtains more power over intelligence than that of its Legislative Branch counterparts. The White House having more power than Congress over oversight lessens the efficiency of intelligence and is an argument for an ever-expanding Executive Branch with its powers.
In the 2006 midterm elections, the Democratic Party won over the House and Senate in part to the backlash of the War in Iraq, from the Republican Party and President George W. Bush. That was not enough to stem the tide of the war, as Bush repeatedly persuaded Congress to expand the War in Iraq even though a majority of his own party opposed the operation (Marshall, 2012). The overreach of executive powers is evident in this case, as a mistrust was built among the Bush Administration leading up to the initial operation in Iraq in 2003.
As a President submits their yearly budget to Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is primarily responsible for this task (“An Overview of the Intelligence Community”, 1996). As an expansive Executive Branch continues to take hold, the effect the OMB has within influencing Congress on intelligence budgets becomes more important. Considering Presidential appointments within the intelligence community, crucial roles such as the CIA’s Inspector General, the heads of seventeen intelligence agencies, and other vital oversight roles are submitted by the President and approved by Congress (“An Overview of the Intelligence Community”, 1996). Such powerful and influential hand-picked nominees are often non-controversial; however, Congress does not normally take the time to investigate the backgrounds of the individuals, but rather take the Executive Branch at its word.
Wrapping it Up
Executive overreach and influence are not going to decrease in the foreseeable future. Congress must be able to put more checks and balances between itself and the Executive Branch in order to look unbiasedly at intelligence reports prepared by various agencies. As all of the United States’ intelligence agencies are bound by law to follow the Constitution and are subject to oversight (“Accountability and Oversight”, n.d.), it is important to note that oversight is the right intention and Congress should continue to do so. However, issues such as an increasingly powerful Executive Branch, the polarization of Congress, and the lack of general oversight all contribute to failures in leadership and effective intelligence.
As Congress is elected by the American public at-large, it may be prudent to inform all members of the bodies of basic national security issues. Confusions and a larger than normal learning curve may hinder this understanding by most members not on the HPSCI and SSCI. The HPSCI and SSCI will still be able to retain more sensitive information, however, all members of Congress must understand the bare minimums of developments domestically and internationally. It is ultimately the public who benefits from national security and intelligence services. A Congress that is better able to explain to the public, what it is the IC does, is one that is better able to make decisions when it comes to electing individuals who will in-turn create stronger oversights and laws to prevent abuses of this information.
Endnotes
Accountability and Oversight. (n.d.). Government Publishing Office. Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg...](https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-INTELLIGENCE/html/int018.html.)
An Overview of the Intelligence Community (1996). Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [fas.org/irp/offdo...](https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int023.html.)
Gleeson, D. (2017). The high cost of politicizing intelligence. The Atlantic. Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [www.theatlantic.com/politics/...](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/the-high-cost-of-politicizing-intelligence/517854/)
Halchin, L. & Kaiser, F. (2012). Congressional oversight of intelligence: Current structures and alternatives. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [fas.org/sgp/crs/i...](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32525.pdf.)
Marshall, W. (2008). Eleven reasons why presidential power inevitably expands and why it matters. Boston University Law Review, 88(505). Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [www.bu.edu/law/journ...](http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/marshall.pdf.)
Priest, D. (2004). Congressional oversight of intelligence criticized. The Washington Post. Retrieved October 23, 2018, from [www.washingtonpost.com/archive/p...](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/04/27/congressional-oversight-of-intelligence-criticized/a306890e-4684-4ed4-99a0-c8ae7f47feb7/?utm_term=.3031174d278e)
Rosenbach, E. & Peritz, A. (2009). Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. Harvard Kennedy School. Retrieved October 22, 2018, from [www.belfercenter.org/publicati...](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/congressional-oversight-intelligence-community.)
Tomes, R. (29 September 2015). On the politization of intelligence. War on the Rocks. Retrieved October 22, 2018, from [warontherocks.com/2015/09/o...](https://warontherocks.com/2015/09/on-the-politicization-of-intelligence/.)