Michael Martinez

Yesterday, I was reminded on LinkedIn that yesterday in 2001, the State Department notified the Russian government that four of its diplomats were considered persona non-grata and immediately jetted from the country (National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2022). This is an older piece I wrote on Robert Hanssen, in particular.

During the transition period from the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation, an FBI agent, Robert Hanssen was handing over top secret, and code word clearance intelligence to the Russian authorities at the KGB and its successor, the SVR (FBI, 2017). Hanssen was using drop spots around the Washington, DC area from 1987 to 1991. After the Soviet Union fell, Hanssen backed off his acts of espionage. In 1999, Hanssen felt comfortable enough to relay information to a different set of agents put in place by the newly elected Russian President, Vladimir Putin (FBI, 2017). During this second string of conveying information, Hanssen was careless. The FBI knew that an agent was relaying classified information to the Russians.

The FBI preceded to offer a former KGB agent, $7 million for information about who the insider was (Johnston, 2002). Though he could not provide a name, a former KGB agent gave up fingerprints that were located on the outside of bags in which documents were delivered. Surveillance of Hanssen began and he was caught taking classified information out of his office. As Hanssen made his last drop in Vienna, Virginia, he was surrounded by multiple FBI agents and taken into custody (FBI, 2017). The arrest was made on February 18, 2001. Rather than the death penalty, Hanssen made a deal to detail his actions and why he betrayed the country and agency (FBI, 2017). Claims were made that he was providing for his family because he was passed over for promotion.

Purpose & Motives

Hanssen’s motivation for dissemination of classified information was purely financial in nature. He accumulated over $600,000 from his acts and was promised up to $800,000 upon the continuation of his activities (Ragavan, Glasser & Barnett, 2003). Hanssen had financial problems as he was at the top of the FBI pay scale, yet was highly in debt due to mortgages and private school for his children (Defense Human Resources Activity, 2003). Decades passed as Hanssen sent highly classified information to Russian agents. In this respect, the FBI failed to catch on to these movements, especially when he was tasked with finding the mole who was himself (Defense Human Resources Activity, 2003). The FBI, CIA, and law enforcement failed to work effectively with each other. It was only after decades, missteps, false accusations of other agents, and countless blame that Hanssen was successfully captured. Had cohesion between the agencies been collaborative, the damage to the intelligence community and national security would be minimal.

Failures & Lessons

Questions were raised in 2003 regarding how Hanssen could give classified information to the Russian government for so long. In previous years, he was cited for security breaches and in the 1980s, Hanssen mishandled classified information (Lichtblau, 2003), which did not raise flags within the FBI. As a result of flying under the radar, he was able to give up some of the US’ most classified information including nuclear secrets and intelligence sharing tactics. Despite these infractions on his record, Hanssen was successfully able to reach promotions (Lichtblau, 2003).  Fatal errors were made. Loopholes such as the lack of oversight and insufficient polygraph examinations may have been to blame. It is noteworthy that due to the Robert Hanssen case, the FBI now polygraphs its employees upon hiring (PR Newswire, 2013). While it is taken for granted today, this was also a flaw in the FBI procedures among hiring new personnel and agents. Hanssen gave the names of over fifty agents who were recruited within Russia, and delivered information regarding flaws in US communications satellites (PBS Newshour, 2002), in addition to giving out technological secrets about US capabilities.

The FBI underwent damage control as Hanssen was arrested. Questions were raised regarding how he could have been continuing to disseminate information to a foreign entity for over fifteen years. A blue-ribbon commission was set up at the FBI to determine what happened and how to catch other moles within the agency (McGeary, 2001). As a result of this commission, the FBI set up a counterespionage division within counterintelligence in order to monitor suspicious activity within the agency and with outside contacts (Office of the Inspector General, 2007). An internal database was also developed to collect financial information on employees, polygraph test results, and background check data in order to successfully track suspicious activity (Office of the Inspector General, 2007). Written and practiced procedures needed to be developed to prevent FBI moles from being allowed to act in the first place.

Conclusion

The Robert Hanssen case is an example of one of the highest caliber espionage acts in United States’ history. As a double agent, he was successfully able to pass along classified information to Russia for decades. A lack of oversight at the IC, and hubris within the organization allowed such national security damage to be conducted for this period of time. Had it not been for pure chance of Hanssen leaving a trail that the FBI was able to follow, chances are he would have continued his actions for the foreseeable future. In this pre-9/11 era, the recommendations in transforming the intelligence community had not yet been put in place or conceived. However, a reliance on the blue-ribbon report from the Office of the Inspector General did make various recommendations such as databases of employment information that can be shared, requiring all employees to be polygraphed upon employment, and financial background checks to negate the opportunities for coercion or cooperation with a foreign entity.

References

Defense Human Resources Activity. (2003). Hanssen: Deep inner conflicts. DHRA. Retrieved June 15, 2017, from [www.dhra.mil/perserec/...](http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/osg/spystory/hanssen.htm)

FBI (2017). Robert Hanssen. Famous Cases & Criminals. Retrieved June 15, 2017, from [www.fbi.gov/history/f...](https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/robert-hanssen)

Johnston, D. (2002). FBI paid $7 million for file on American spying for Russia. New York Times. Retrieved June 15, 2017, from [www.nytimes.com/2002/10/1...](http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/18/us/fbi-paid-7-) million-for-file-on-american-spying-for-russia.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FHanssen%2C%20Robert%20Philip&actio n=click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=            latest&contentPlacement=9&pgtype=collection

Lichtblau, E. (2003). FBI failed to act on spy despite signals, report says. New York Times. Retrieved June 15, 2017, from [www.nytimes.com/2003/08/1...](http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/15/us/fbi-failed-to-act-) on-spy-despite-signals-report-says.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FHanssen%2C%20Robert%20Philip&action =click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=l            atest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection.

McGeary, J. (2001). The FBI spy it took 15 years to discover one of the most damaging cases of espionage in U.S. history. An inside look at the secret life, and final capture, of Robert Hanssen. Time. Retrieved June 15, 2017, from [content.time.com/time/worl...](http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047748,00.html)

Ragavan, C., Glasser, J., & Barnett, M. (2003). The Traitors. U.S. News & World Report,134(3), 66. Retrieved June 15, 2017.

Office of the Inspector General (2007). A review of the FBI’s progress in responding to recommendations in the office of the inspector general report on Robert Hanssen. Retrieved June 15, 2017, from [oig.justice.gov/special/s...](https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0710/final.pdf#?)

PBS Newshour. (2002). Damage assessment: Convicted spy Robert Hanssen. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from [www.pbs.org/newshour/...](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law-jan-june02-hanssen_5-10/)

PR Newswire (2013, October 2). Witness to history: The investigation of Robert Hanssen. PR Newswire US. Retrieved June 15, 2017.

As the Intelligence Community (IC) works to rebuild trust between its agencies, it's citizens, and other partner nations, this is a great time to remind us all about the basics of how leadership within the IC and it's ongoing struggle with national oversight through checks and balances. I originally wrote this piece in October of 2018.

Setting the Scene

It is the role of Congress to monitor and create oversight of the intelligence community. Congress checks for the abuse of power within the seventeen agencies including the ODNI and considers abuse of power by the other two branches of government. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) are the two primary governing bodies that provide oversight of American intelligence (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). As the Executive Branch sets foreign policy and intelligence priorities, Congress is to be kept ‘fully informed’ of large-scale intelligence activities set forth by The White House (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). This procedure is mandated by the National Security Act of 1947.

The laws of oversight and leadership become complicated as competing interests are tasked with budgeting, making intelligence law, enacting recommendations, and following through on programs. Each stakeholder has their own interest. These interests often clash as the oversight of IC has turned into a power grab by congressional committees, as well as the executive and judicial branches. The politization of intelligence matters, lack of congressional oversight, and the increase of influences by the executive branch all must be addressed to ensure the best possible leadership and oversight outcomes.

The Politization of Intelligence Matters

Politization of the IC's recommendations, outcomes, and funding does not just stem from political parties, but rather expediency, groupthink, and biases that may exist within Congress or in the Executive Branch. Mark Lowenthal, a career intelligence expert, states that analysts alter assessments to support policy, lawmakers influence intelligence analysis outcomes, a history of cognitive bias on the part of analysts, and lawmakers often ‘cherry pick’ analysis to support their own ideals (Tomes, 2015). Such destructive habits undermine the autonomy and independence of the intelligence community. Additionally, given the secrecy in which the IC operates, dissent is often dismissed, and whistleblowers may be silenced as a result.

Former Secretary of Defense, then CIA Director, Robert Gates said of politization of intelligence in the 1990s, “deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence” (Gleeson, 2017). Another issue with politization deals around false information, group think narratives, and different ways of categorizing intelligence threats based on a single individual rather than involving a process of many (Gleeson, 2017). Utilizing estimative probabilities in intelligence assessments is also an obstacle to politicization of intelligence through Congress. The goal of estimative probabilities is to reduce the amount of uncertainty when analyzing information (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012).

 Terms such as probably, likely, certain, somewhat certain, et al., are open to numerous interpretations by Congress, and therefore can be politized as wanting intelligence to say what is politically convenient over what may be occurring. Estimative probability is vital to assessing viable alternatives to an action. Analysis of competing hypothesis (ACH) is the core of intelligence (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012). The IC must conduct this analysis free and independently of out all outside influence. However, when this analysis is presented to congressional committees or the White House, options may be chosen based on their own interpretations of risk, an open definition of estimative probability, and what is politically expedient.

Lack of Congressional Oversight

A long-term debate exists as to whether congressional oversight over the IC is too intrusive, counterproductive, and political; or does not go far enough to keep program scopes and civil liberties in check. ­As Congress represents the American people, they must also strike a balance between doing what is necessary for national security and explaining their votes and policies to their voters. Loch Johnson, a University of Georgia professor stated, “September 11 was an intelligence failure, but it's also a policy failure, not only in the White House but in Congress. There's really a heavy onus on these intelligence committees to probe what's going on” (Priest, 2004). Politization of intelligence often comes at the expedience of national security, considering real threats, or what may be convenient for the next congressional election.

Former Ohio Senator, Mike DeWine, stated that the learning curve is quite large for those serving on the congressional intelligence committees (Priest, 2004). The failure or lack of understanding of policies and procedures within the IC is too cumbersome, especially to learn in one Senate or House term. DeWine recommends a restructuring to make oversight more “user friendly” for the average Congressperson to understand and convey to constituents and the agencies themselves. A solution to this problem must involve revisiting the 9/11 Commission Report and further streamlining dissemination techniques now that most of the recommendations have been implemented on the Federal, State, and local levels. Lastly, the barriers between Congress and the intelligence community must be further siloed from political influence.

In the event congressional oversight committees were to consolidate into a few bodies, the Executive Branch would have more influence as would the specific Congressmembers on the new committees. Also, the politization of individual nominations to several intelligence agencies would become a problem, further blending in the independence of intelligence.

Executive Branch Influences

Prior to September 11^th, the Executive Branch was able to reduce congressional committees overseeing intelligence from eight to two over the course of the 1980s (Halchin & Kaiser, 2012). As a result, it also reduced the number of Congressmembers who can receive information requiring a clearance. As Congress is not briefed as frequently as the Executive Branch on intelligence matters, it is difficult to tell what may constitute a national emergency or crucial military exercise (Marshall, 2008). Congress must rely on the Executive Branch to disseminate information to the relevant committees (Marshall, 2008). This is an example of how the Executive Branch obtains more power over intelligence than that of its Legislative Branch counterparts. The White House having more power than Congress over oversight lessens the efficiency of intelligence and is an argument for an ever-expanding Executive Branch with its powers.

In the 2006 midterm elections, the Democratic Party won over the House and Senate in part to the backlash of the War in Iraq, from the Republican Party and President George W. Bush. That was not enough to stem the tide of the war, as Bush repeatedly persuaded Congress to expand the War in Iraq even though a majority of his own party opposed the operation (Marshall, 2012). The overreach of executive powers is evident in this case, as a mistrust was built among the Bush Administration leading up to the initial operation in Iraq in 2003.

As a President submits their yearly budget to Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is primarily responsible for this task (“An Overview of the Intelligence Community”, 1996). As an expansive Executive Branch continues to take hold, the effect the OMB has within influencing Congress on intelligence budgets becomes more important. Considering Presidential appointments within the intelligence community, crucial roles such as the CIA’s Inspector General, the heads of seventeen intelligence agencies, and other vital oversight roles are submitted by the President and approved by Congress (“An Overview of the Intelligence Community”, 1996). Such powerful and influential hand-picked nominees are often non-controversial; however, Congress does not normally take the time to investigate the backgrounds of the individuals, but rather take the Executive Branch at its word.

Wrapping it Up

Executive overreach and influence are not going to decrease in the foreseeable future. Congress must be able to put more checks and balances between itself and the Executive Branch in order to look unbiasedly at intelligence reports prepared by various agencies. As all of the United States’ intelligence agencies are bound by law to follow the Constitution and are subject to oversight (“Accountability and Oversight”, n.d.), it is important to note that oversight is the right intention and Congress should continue to do so. However, issues such as an increasingly powerful Executive Branch, the polarization of Congress, and the lack of general oversight all contribute to failures in leadership and effective intelligence.

As Congress is elected by the American public at-large, it may be prudent to inform all members of the bodies of basic national security issues. Confusions and a larger than normal learning curve may hinder this understanding by most members not on the HPSCI and SSCI. The HPSCI and SSCI will still be able to retain more sensitive information, however, all members of Congress must understand the bare minimums of developments domestically and internationally. It is ultimately the public who benefits from national security and intelligence services. A Congress that is better able to explain to the public, what it is the IC does, is one that is better able to make decisions when it comes to electing individuals who will in-turn create stronger oversights and laws to prevent abuses of this information.

Endnotes

Accountability and Oversight. (n.d.). Government Publishing Office. Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg...](https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-INTELLIGENCE/html/int018.html.)

An Overview of the Intelligence Community (1996). Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [fas.org/irp/offdo...](https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int023.html.)

Gleeson, D. (2017). The high cost of politicizing intelligence. The Atlantic. Retrieved October    24, 2018, from [www.theatlantic.com/politics/...](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/the-high-cost-of-politicizing-intelligence/517854/)

Halchin, L. & Kaiser, F. (2012). Congressional oversight of intelligence: Current structures and    alternatives. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [fas.org/sgp/crs/i...](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32525.pdf.)

Marshall, W. (2008). Eleven reasons why presidential power inevitably expands and why it matters. Boston University Law Review, 88(505). Retrieved October 24, 2018, from [www.bu.edu/law/journ...](http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/marshall.pdf.)

Priest, D. (2004). Congressional oversight of intelligence criticized. The Washington Post. Retrieved October 23, 2018, from [www.washingtonpost.com/archive/p...](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/04/27/congressional-oversight-of-intelligence-criticized/a306890e-4684-4ed4-99a0-c8ae7f47feb7/?utm_term=.3031174d278e)

Rosenbach, E. & Peritz, A. (2009). Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. Harvard Kennedy School. Retrieved October 22, 2018, from [www.belfercenter.org/publicati...](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/congressional-oversight-intelligence-community.)

Tomes, R. (29 September 2015). On the politization of intelligence. War on the Rocks. Retrieved October 22, 2018, from [warontherocks.com/2015/09/o...](https://warontherocks.com/2015/09/on-the-politicization-of-intelligence/.)

Gone are the days of the threat of nations stockpiling ICMB's to deter one another from catastrophic launches, and the last known war. With the threat of climate change, and the need for natural resource consumption and build up, the Arctic is quickly becoming the most sought-after area for these rich resources and positioning by first world nations.

The Arctic is growing in geostrategic importance and potentially becoming yet another zone for strategic competition, as this previously impenetrable territory becomes increasingly accessible to navigation and exploitation. The region is resource rich: it is estimated to contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 30 percent of its natural gas reserves.

Source: CSIS.org

In late 2020, the US' National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) stated that the Arctic should no longer be considered a "buffer zone" for the United States, but rather a tactical area that needs much more DoD investment.

Those knowledgeable about history will recall the Alaska Purchase in 1867, when Secretary of State Seward, purchased the Alaska Territories for then, an astounding $7 million from the Russians. This came to be known as "Seward's Folly". Today, strategically, it's one of the best deals in American history next to the Louisiana Purchase and the Island of Manhattan. Alaska gives direct route to the Arctic and, allows the Government to keep an eye on Russian movements in the region.

In addition to national resources and defensive postures, various Arctic shipping lanes are taking precedent due to national borders becoming shorter the closer you get to the North Pole. Much like China's Belt & Road initiative across its regions, the Arctic players such as the US, Russia, Denmark, and Norway, achieve to do the same, while becoming dominant on these shipping lanes.

Distance savings along Arctic shipping routes can be as high as 40 percent compared to the traditional shipping lanes via the Suez Canal. Shorter sailing distances allow for considerable fuel cost savings. The reduced number of days at sea allows a ship to make more return trips resulting in increased revenue and potentially greater profits.

Source: The Arctic Institute

As Russia has taken a more adversarial tone in the region, it is more important than ever that NATO members conduct joint deterrent exercises to assist in keeping Russia, and to bigger extent, China in check. Reengaging the United States in its partnerships around the world is one of the many solutions that must take place to ensure regional Arctic supremacy for shipping and other various resources.

Looking at all the threats that are deterring a successful and peaceful Arctic, the largest, by far is that of climate change. The Department of Defense says that the melting of the ice is allowing other nations to "seep" in for potentially nefarious reasons, and wreaking havoc with defensive communication systems and the types of ships that are needed to navigate these new waters.

From a commercial perspective, cruise line companies have already had an abysmal year with the spread of COVID across the world. Traveling across either poles will create issues for those liner companies who concentrate on winter and Alaska excursions and sailings. Much like the DoD, these private companies will have to invest in more durable ships with enhanced safety features as well as more robust communication systems in case of crisis; such as an international incident.

Keeping a close eye on trends, such as engaging the natives of the region are ever important as to figuring out how the sea levels ebb and flow on a general season and comparing that to longer term ice melting trends.

As most industries will know, their entire risk portfolio and analysis will come down to what their insurance partners will find:

“The Arctic is at the frontier of risk,” said Neil Roberts, head of marine and aviation at Lloyd’s of London Market Association, adding that insurers assessing Arctic projects must consider environmental and social factors as well as commercial ones.

Source: Reuters

While this will determine the entire tourism market in the Arctic moving forward, it is important to realize that this effects every single industry that sails a ship or flies over the region. Local fishing businesses, or small tourist companies will be hit hardest. An often overlooked industry are the fisheries. Cargo ships may not be not be able to afford to navigate the Arctic's waters due to insurance limits.

Everything that occurs in the Arctic is inter-connected. It is a region of its own with military, economic, diplomatic, and scientific missions. If one of these factors tips out of balance, it could mean one nation having total domination of all others for resources and monopolies on industries. It could also mean that the Arctic is left for no nation or person to utilize.

Global agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords are more important than ever to address the issues in Arctic. Climate change in general will cause conflict across the world as some nations will gain land, while others lose theirs. Five years in, there has been much success among member nations, but there is much more work to be done. When the US rejoins the Accords, there is potential this will be taken much more seriously and with results to show. Right now, it is pivotal for the diplomatic, intelligence, and scientific communities to keep the Arctic flowing.

Note: This piece was originally published at RealClear Defense on January 16, 2018.

During the past year, The Trump Administration and the Kim Jong-Un Regime have been trading consequential barbs regarding nuclear testing and first/second strike capabilities. While rhetoric may seem that war on the Peninsula is unavoidable, there are still ways to engage the Kim Jong-un Regime while keeping the peace among Asian allies.

As recently as October, U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, stated that the U.S. was in ‘direct contact’ with North Korea and are open to the possibility of talks.^[1] Until current conditions change, rigorous diplomacy can still take place. Also, U.S. Defense Secretary, Jim Mattis, has said, “No one is rushing for war.”^[2] A strong majority of the U.S. Administration appears to favor a diplomatic strategy; however, they must convince President Trump to cut back on the back and forth banter.

The United States must make clear that war is the last option and not the first. Diplomatic tactics must be fully exhausted before further actions are considered. Any act of war by either side would result in a full arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, not limited to chemical, biological, and nuclear by North Korea, an “appropriate response” by the South and allies, and an estimated 1 million deceased.^[3] The stakes have never been higher taking out the first two World Wars, making pre-emptive strikes a horrible miscalculation by either side.

Among South Koreans, the will to avoid conflict has always been followed up with measures of peace. However, the consequences of such a military outbreak are laid out for the world to see. South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s office said in August:

“Above all, President Moon emphasized that South Korea can never accept a war erupting again on the Korean Peninsula…He stressed that the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved in a peaceful, diplomatic manner through close coordination between South Korea and the United States."^[4]

Diplomatic measures must engage China, Japan, United States, and the larger Six-Party talks that began in 2003 and, but failed in 2009 as North Korea continued their hostile programs. Michael Fuchs, from Foreign Affairs, notes that talks between Washington and Pyongyang can parallel forward momentum that the United States had in negotiating the Iranian nuclear deal.^[5] Like all international agreements and arrangements, compromise is paramount and significant concessions required by both sides.

Deterrence methods by the United States and its allies need to be coupled with open dialog so both compromise and sincerity can be on display for Kim Jong-un’s regime. If the U.S. ratchets down the rhetoric, North Korea will have a diminished case for nuclearizing the peninsula. In any scenario, China must be part of the solution and not the problem.

In September, Former Ambassador Christopher Hill told NPR’s Mary Louise Kelly that, “I think there needs to be an understanding that China has to be part of that solution.”^[6] Ninety percent of North Korean trade is with China, therefore making China the most important partner allies have in denuclearizing the North.

Liu Xiaoming, China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, stated he was “cautiously optimistic” that a diplomatic solution can be found to North Korean nuclearization.^[7] As China is wary of U.S.- South Korean relations, they recognize that a non-threating North Korea is in its regional self-interest. As negotiations will require compromise, China will continue to play an integral part in mediation between the U.S. and North Korea to find an amicable solution to avoid detrimental combat that will likely change the world.

While China claims it has done “everything its power” to end the crisis, the United States must do its part and bring China closer into the fold. A bilateral strategy must be initiated by the two major powers to engage North Korea in such a way where a small level of trust is created to begin talks. Possible concessions include acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear power with the ultimate goal of ending their program. Additionally, South Korea aligning themselves more with China and trade will result in a reengagement of trust between the Peninsula and bring China to the table as part of a reinvigorated Six-Party Talks.

For the United States to bring China to the table, the Trump Administration must also acknowledge China’s place in the world. They will be a superpower going forward, no economic trends or labeling as a “currency manipulator” will reverse that trend. Strategic diplomacy aimed towards quelling China’s concerns about the U.S. is a paramount position to start with.

China and the U.S. may be distrustful at this moment in time, but one cannot ignore its power going forward. Bilateral talks must begin with an agreement between China and the U.S, as North Korean talks are intertwined with a rebalanced relationship.

Endnotes:

[1] BBC News. (16 October 2017). North Korea crisis: Tillerson says diplomacy will continue. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from [www.bbc.com/news/worl...](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41629233.)

[2] Stewart, P. (26 October 2017). Mattis talks diplomacy on North Korea ahead of Trump’s Asia tour. Reuters. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from [www.reuters.com/article/u...](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/mattis-talks-diplomacy-on-north-korea-ahead-of-trumps-asia-tour-idUSKBN1CW04W.)

[3] Powell, B. (24 April 2017). What war with North Korea will look like. Newsweek. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from [www.newsweek.com/2017/05/0...](http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html.)

[4] Harris, G. (7 August 2017). A rare round of diplomacy from North Korea’s top diplomat. New York Times. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from [www.nytimes.com/2017/08/0...](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/world/asia/north-korea-asean-tillerson.html.)

[5] Fuchs, M. (21 December 2017). The North Korea deal. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/...](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-12-21/north-korea-deal.)

[6] NPR Morning Edition. (4 September 2017). What diplomacy can and can’t change with North Korea. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from [www.npr.org/2017/09/0...](https://www.npr.org/2017/09/04/548415546/what-diplomacy-can-and-cant-change-with-north-korea.)

[7] Jones, S. (19 November 2017). China optimistic diplomacy will solve North Korean nuclear issue. Bloomberg. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from [www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-19/china-optimistic-diplomacy-will-solve-north-korea-nuclear-issue.)